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NOTE
THE PRICE ISN'T RIGHT:
44 LIQUORMART, INC. V. RHODE ISLAND
PROMOTES FREE SPEECH IN COMMERCIAL
ADVERTISING
I. INTRODUCTION

It was an early morning in 1993 when a Rhode Island woman reached
for her Sunday paper and a cup of coffee. As she was flipping through the
numerous advertising inserts, she glanced over the items on sale at 44
Liquormart. The store advertised low prices on peanuts, potato chips, and
Schweppes mixers. The advertisement included pictures of vodka and rum
bottles and the printed exclamation "WOW." The woman gave the insert
little thought before turning to the next page. The state of Rhode Island
gave it plenty of thought, however, and fined 44 Liquormart $400 for its
advertisement.!
To the Rhode Island state legislature, the word "WOW" implied that
44 Liquormart's prices were lower than average 2-a direct violation of
their price advertising ban on liquor.3 Presumably, this type of
advertisement would lead to price wars on liquor and necessarily
contribute to greater alcohol consumption among Rhode Island citizens.4
1. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 116 S. Ct. 1495, 1503 (1996).
2. Id.
3. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 3-8-7 (1987). The statute regarding the advertising price of malt
beverages, cordials, wine or distilled liquor states:
No manufacturer, wholesaler, or shipper from without this state and no holder of a
license issued under the provisions of this title and chapter shall cause or permit
the advertising in any manner whatsoever of the price of any malt beverage,
cordials, wine or distilled liquor offered for sale in this state; provided, however,
that the provisions of this section shall not apply to the price signs or tags attached
to or placed on merchandise for sale within the licensed premises in accordance
with rules and regulations of the department.
Id.
4. See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Racine, 829 F. Supp. 543, 545 (D.R.I. 1993). The district
court heard testimony from three experts and evaluated numerous research studies regarding the
effects of advertising on alcohol consumption. Although the experts conceded that some studies
have shown a slight correlation between liquor advertising and alcoholism, each stated that there
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Depending upon the product advertised, the government may take an
active role in restricting or regulating the methods by which merchants can
market their products.
This is particularly true where the item is
considered to be a "vice product." 6 State legislatures justify this type of
regulation by asserting the
state's interest in thwarting excessive
7
indulgence in such products.
Several jurisdictions have implemented statutes similar to Rhode
Island's price advertising ban that effectively govern the commercial
advertising of liquor. Some states prohibit the advertising of alcohol with
figures such as the Easter Bunny, 8 Santa Claus, 9 or any deceased
president.' 0 Other statutes forbid references to Mother's Day, Holy Week,
or biblical themes in liquor advertisements."
Still other states restrict any
12
aerial advertisements of beer or wine.

is no empirical evidence supporting the proposition that the presence or absence of such
advertising significantly impacts alcohol consumption. Id. at 546.
5. 44 Liquormart, 116 S. Ct. at 1512. Commercial advertising, whether contained in
newspapers, billboards, television, radio, or otherwise, is a powerful tool in inducing consumers
to purchase products or services. Id. at 1504. Newspapers and magazines generally derive
substantial revenues from liquor advertisers. Felix H. Kent, A Significant First Amendment
Decision,N.Y.L.J., June 21, 1996, at 3.
6. "Vice products" include those goods or activities, such as alcohol, tobacco, or gambling,
that are thought to be harmful to consumers. See Posadas de Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism
Co. of Puerto Rico, 478 U.S. 328, 341 (1985).
7. 44 Liquormart, 116 S. Ct. at 1509 n.14.
8. See, e.g., CONN. AGENCIES REGS. § 30-6-A31a (1964). Section (a)(7) of the law states:
An advertisement of alcoholic liquor shall not contain any statement, picture or
illustration referring to Easter, Holy Week, Mother's Day or "Santa Claus,"
including names synonymous with "Santa Claus," or the name of or any reference
to or depiction of any biblical character,provided nothing herein shall operate to
prohibit references to the Christmas holiday season if such references do not
include statements, pictures or illustrations on strictly religious themes.
Id. (emphasis added); see also OHiO ADMIN. CODE § 4301:1-1-44(C) (1984) (prohibiting the
portrayal of any "military subject" or picture or reference to Santa Claus in alcohol
advertisements); N.Y. COP. CODES R & REGS., tit. 9, § 83.3(c)(2)(xiii) (1995) (prohibiting
interior signs advertising alcohol with biblical characters).
9. See, e.g., CONN. AGENCIES REGS. § 30-6-A31a (1964).
10. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.42 (West 1991).
Any person who shall distribute or post or cause or procure to be distributed or
posted any advertisement of any form or nature whatsoever of spirituous or
intoxicating liquors, which advertisement contains any reference whatever to any
deceased ex-president of the United States of America, either by the use of his
name, his picture, quotations from his writings or utterances, scenes purporting to
be from his life or otherwise, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.
Id.(emphasis added); see also infra Part II.B.
11. See, e.g., CONN. AGENCIES REGS. § 30-6-A31a (1964).
12. Jerome L. Wilson, A Toast to Commercial Speech, N.J.L.J., Aug. 26, 1996, at S-14.
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In 44 Liquormart,Inc. v. Rhode Island,13 the United States Supreme
Court dealt a striking blow to such restrictions on commercial advertising.
The Court held that Rhode Island's price advertising ban on alcohol
violated the First Amendment. 14 This case marked a dramatic shift in the
Court's approach to the constitutional protection afforded to commercial
speech.15
This Note examines the impact of 44 Liquormart on commercial
advertising and asserts that states have less burdensome means to achieve
their goals. The Note ultimately concludes that the current test for
commercial speech, as applied by the Court, no longer provides sufficient
analysis. Rather, the correct analysis should be strict scrutiny, which is
afforded to all levels of speech under the First Amendment. A free
marketplace of ideas through counter-advertising or educational
campaigns is a better reasoned approach to tempering public consumption
16
of vice products than banning product advertisements altogether.
Part II explores the historic treatment of commercial speech under the
First Amendment by tracing the Court's struggle with the level of
discretion to afford state legislatures. Part III explains and analyzes the
Central Hudson test' 7 as a method for evaluating the constitutionality of
state regulations. Central Hudson provides an essential background to
understand the constitutional impact of 44 Liquormart on commercial
speech. Part IV provides a detailed discussion of 44 Liquormart v. Rhode
Island and examines how the Central Hudson test has changed in light of
the Court's divided application of the test.
Part V analyzes the
constitutional implication of 44 Liquormart, including the Court's express
rejection of judicial precedent, the restructuring of the Central Hudson
test, and the impact of the case on numerous state restrictions governing
alcohol advertising. Finally, Part VI concludes that the Court has applied a
standard even greater than strict scrutiny to blanket bans on commercial
advertising. While such bans may pass strict scrutiny analysis, they still
may fail the Court's current constitutional test.

13. 116 S. Ct. 1495 (1996).
14. Id. at 1501.
15. Compare 44 Liquormart, 116 S. Ct. at 1495, with Posadas de Puerto Rico Assocs. v.

Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 478 U.S. 328 (1986).
16. 44 Liquormart, 116 S. Ct. at 1510 (Stevens, J., plurality opinion); see also discussion
infra Part IV.C.3.a.

17. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
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II. A TIMELINE ANALYSIS OF THE PROTECTION AFFORDED TO
COMMERCIAL SPEECH

A constitutional evolution has occurred over the last fifty years in the
commercial speech arena. Since the early 1940s, the Supreme Court has
essentially reversed its position on the amount of protection afforded to
commercial speech. I s This section traces the evolution and provides a
perspective to better understand the current commercial speech doctrine.
It begins with a discussion of current statutory law and places the law in
historical context by examining some earlier commercial advertising cases.
A. Modern Impacts
Despite the Court's moderate protection of commercial speech prior
to 44 Liquormart,19 state legislatures continue to exert enormous control
over the substance of advertising. For example, Connecticut prohibits
liquor advertisements from referring to Easter, Holy Week, Mother's Day,
or Santa Claus;20 Michign law mandates that no deceased president be
referred to in liquor ads; North Carolina authorizes the State to prohibit
the advertising of alcohol in any newspaper, pamphlet or other print
media; 22 and Ohio restricts
the use of references to any military subject in
23
liquor advertisements.
Other states take an even broader approach to liquor advertisement
regulation. New York, for example, gives regulators unfettered discretion
to require that liquor advertisements be "dignified, modest and in good
taste. ' ' 24 Similarly, North Carolina affords peace officers unrestricted
authorization to destroy, upon discovery, any billboard visible from a
street or public highway that advertises liquor.25 Similar statutes prohibit
26
reference to the curative or therapeutic effects of alcohol, even if truthful.

18. See Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942) (giving no protection to handbills
advertising tours for a fee).
19. See infra Parts Il.B, IlI.A, and accompanying notes for a discussion of the evolution of
"moderate protection."
20. CONN. AGENCIES REGS. § 30-6-A31a (1964).
21. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.42 (West 1991).
22. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 18b-105 (1996).
23. OIO ADMIN. CODE § 4301:1-1-44(c) (1984).
24. N.Y. COMP. CODES R.& REGS., tit. 9, § 83.3(c)(2)(ix) (1995).
25. Wilson, supranote 12, at S-14.
26. OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 4301:1-1-03 (1994). Section (j) states: "The advertisement shall
not contain any statement, design, or device representing that the use of any wine has curative or
therapeutic effects, if such statement is untrue in any particular, or tends to create a misleading
impression." Id.; see also N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS., tit. 9, § 83.3(c)(2)(vii) (1995).
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These laws illustrate the invasive control that various states have taken
with respect to commercial advertising, demonstrating that Rhode Island's
price advertising ban on alcohol is not unique.
B. The Early Cases
Historically, the Court did not regard commercial speech worthy of
First Amendment protection. In 1942, Valentine v. Chrestensen2 7 upheld
state-created restrictions on the distribution of handbills, reasoning that
speech which is primarily
commercial in nature does not deserve
28
constitutional protection.
Within the last two decades, however, the Court has reconsidered its
position that commercial advertisements
were .an. unprotected
category of
...
.
29
speech. In the 1975 decision Bigelow v. Virginia, the Court reversed a
conviction for the violation of a Virginia statute prohibiting the circulation
3
of any publication encouraging or promoting the practice of abortion. 0
The Bigelow Court held that commercial speech was entitled to
constitutional protection
and that it was not devoid of value in the
31
marketplace of ideas.
The next step in the protection of commercial speech came in
Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
Inc. 2 That Court held that the dissemination of truthful information
regarding consumer products, in this case pharmaceuticals, constituted a
category of speech worthy of First Amendment protection. 33 Justice
Blackmun, delivering the majority opinion of the Court, reasoned that:
Advertising, however tasteless and excessive it sometimes may
seem, is nonetheless dissemination of information as to who is
producing and selling what product, for what reason, and at
what price. So long as we preserve a predominately free
enterprise economy, the allocation of our resources in large
measure will be made through numerous private economic
27. 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
28. Id; see also Business Executives Move for Vietnam Peace v. FCC, 450 F.2d 642, 658
n.38 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (stating that commercial speech is afforded less constitutional protection
because it does not communicate ideas and is not related to the purpose of the First
Amendment); Urowsky v. Board of Regents, 342 N.E.2d 583 (N.Y. 1975) (upholding a
regulation imposed by commissioner of education prohibiting the advertising of discount
prescription prices by pharmacies).

29. 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
30. Id. at 825-26.
31. Id.

32. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
33. Id.

138

LOYOLA OFLOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LA WJOURNAL

[Vol. 18

decisions. It is a matter of public interest that those decisions,

in the aggregate, be intelligent and well informed. To this
34 end,
the free flow of commercial information is indispensable.
According to the Court, the public's right to accurate and
nonmisleading information supported the rationale for affording First
Amendment protection to commercial speech. 35 The State's paternalistic
attitude that the public would make poor decisions even after receiving
3
accurate information did not justify the blanket ban on such advertising.
The better reasoned alternative provides the public with truthful
information and allows the public to perceive its own best interest,
37
assuming that such choices are based on well-informed decisions.
"[P]eople will perceive their own best interests if only they are well
enough informed, and . . . the best means to that 38
' end is to open the
channels of communication rather than to close them."
In 1980, the landmark decision of Central Hudson Gas & Electric
Corp. v. Public Service Commission39 restructured and refined the Court's
4

view on the degree of constitutional protection given to advertising. 0
Prior to CentralHudson, the Court took a pragmatic, yet lenient, approach

to commercial speech. In Virginia State Board of Pharmacy, the Court

declared that all attempts to dissuade legal choices by citizens by keeping
them ignorant are impermissible. 4 1 The Court's decision in Central
42
Hudson required states to justify their restrictions under a four-prong test
designed to ensure that advertising was afforded some degree of
protection. However, the CentralHudson test has been neither uniformly
nor fairly applied, 43 particularly with regard to advertisements
relating to
"vice" products such as alcohol, tobacco, and gambling. 44

34. Id.at 765.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 770.
37. Id.

38. Virginia State Bd.of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 770; see also 44 Liquormart, 116 S.Ct. at
1505 (Stevens, J., plurality opinion) (citing Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927)
(Brandeis, J.,concurring)).

Justice Brandeis, objecting to prohibitions on political speech,

stated, "the remedy to be applied is more speech, not enforced silence. Only an emergency can
justify repression." Whitney, 274 U.S. at 377.

39. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
40. Id.; see also infra Part III.
41. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy,425 U.S. at 748; see also Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at
574 (Blackmun, J., joined by Brennan, J., concurring).
42. See discussion infra Part ILI.A.
43. See discussion infra Part HLI.B.

44. See discussion infra Part III.B. Compare Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476
(1995) (holding that a labeling ban restricting the advertisement of alcohol content on beer
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III. THE CENTRAL HUDSON TEST: THE COURT'S INABILITY TO STAY ON
THE BALANCE BEAM

A. The Central Hudson Four-ProngTest
The Central Hudson Court held that a complete ban on the
advertising of electric utility companies was an unconstitutional
abridgment of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. 45 For the first time,
the Court established a four-part test to analyze when encroachment on
commercial speech through state legislation is acceptable.
The first prong demands that the commercial speech concern a lawful
46
activity, and that the substance of the advertisement not be misleading.
The second prong necessitates that the government assert a substantial
47 The third prong mandates that the
regulations.
interest to justify •speech
•48
•
Finally, the fourth
regulation directly advance the interest asserted.
restrictive than
not
be
more
prong requires that the proposed regulation
49
necessary to accomplish the asserted end.
Justices Blackmun and Brennan both held that strict scrutiny should
apply whenever the government attempts to suppress speech where the
restriction "deprive[s] consumers of information about products or services
that are legally offered for sale . . . .,50 Justice Rehnquist, in a dissenting
opinion, argued that great deference must be given to state legislatures in
determining states' interests and whether the imposed restrictions are the
In this manner,
least restrictive means of accomplishing such interests.
compromise between strict scrutiny and a
the fourth prong represents a 52
legislative deference approach.
While the test provides a general guideline for evaluating commercial
advertising under the Constitution, the courts have applied it on an

labels violated the First Amendment), with United States v. Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. 418
(1993) (stating that a federal statute prohibiting lottery advertising in states which prohibited
lotteries is a constitutional exercise of state authority), and Posadas de Puerto Rico Assocs. v.
Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 478 U.S. 328 (1986) (holding that advertising restrictions on casino
gambling do not violate First Amendment protections).
45. CentralHudson, 447 U.S. at 570.
46. Id.at 566.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.at 556.
50. Id at 574 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
51. CentralHudson, 447 U.S. at 589-90 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
52. Steven Younger, Comment, Alcoholic Beverage Advertising on the Airwaves:
Alternatives to a Ban or Counteradvertising,34 UCLA L. REv. 1139, 1164 (1987).
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inconsistent basis. 53 Furthermore, the fourth prong, which requires that the
regulation be "no more extensive than necessary," gives the courts
enormous discretion.54 Some commentators argue that the test represents a
compromise by the Court in determining the proper level of scrutiny
afforded to commercial speech. 55
As the Note concludes, this
"compromise" may result in affording commercial speech greater than
strict scrutiny protection. 56
In many respects, Central Hudson's fourth prong is pivotal in the
court's determination of upholding or denouncing the state's regulation of
commercial advertising. 7 The first two prongs generate little controversy.
If the advertising is false, misleading,
or deceptive,
the court need not
•
• 58
reach the question of First Amendment protection. Likewise, if 5the
state
9
fails to show an interest in regulating the speech, the issue is moot.
The third NOrong is more problematic and tends to turn on the specific
facts involved.
In commercial speech cases, courts primarily focus on
whether or not the regulation directly advances the state's
interest; this is
61
trial.
at
introduced
evidence
the
of
matter
a
generally
The bulk of the Court's analysis, however, centers on the fourth
prong. 62 Commercial speech cases turn on whether a less restrictive
method of achieving the state's interest exists. 63 However, as the
following cases illustrate, this element of the test serves as a pragmatic
justification for the Court's capricious holdings.

53. See infra Part III.B.
54. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 569-70.
55. Younger, supra note 52, at 1164.
56. See discussion infra Part VI.
57. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 569-70.
58. Id. at 566-69.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 557.
61. See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 39 F.3d 5 (1st Cir. 1994) (finding expert
testimony revealed there was no connection between the price advertising ban and the level of
alcohol sales or consumption among Rhode Island citizens); see also discussion infra Part IV.B
and accompanying notes.
62. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 569-71.
63. See discussion infra Part IV.B and accompanying notes.
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B. The Central Hudson Test in Action
1. The Original Application
In CentralHudson, the Court determined that although the State had
a substantial interest in attempting to conserve energy by banning utility
advertising, and such a ban would directly further that interest, the ban was
more restrictive than necessary to achieve the State's goal. 64 The Court
reasoned that disseminating information regarding energy-saving practices
or restricting the format or content of the advertisements would further the
State's interest in a less intrusive manner.65
Six years later, in Posadasde Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Co.
of Puerto Rico,66 the Court upheld an advertising restriction on casino
gambling aimed at residents of Puerto Rico, but permitted the same
advertising if directed toward tourists. 67 Writing for the majority, Chief
Justice Rehnquist, the primary dissenter in Central Hudson, held that the
advertising restriction survived the Central Hudson test.6 8 The ban
involved a legal activity that was not misleading to the public.69 The State
had a substantial interest in reducing the practice of casino gambling by
Puerto Rican residents; indeed the legislature could reasonably find that:
Excessive casino gambling among local residents . . . would
produce serious harmful effects on the health, safety and
welfare of the Puerto Rican citizens, such as the disruption of
moral and cultural patterns, the increase in local crime, the
fostering of prostitution, the development
of corruption, and the
70
infiltration of organized crime.

The Court found a clear fit between Puerto Rico's interest in
regulating Aambling by its own residents and the ban on casino
advertising.
Chief Justice Rehnquist largely disregarded the fourth
prong, stating only:
We also think it clear beyond peradventure that the challenged
statute and regulations satisfy the fourth and last step of the
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

CentralHudson, 447 U.S. at 569-71.
Id. at 571.
478 U.S. 328 (1986).
Id.
Id. at 340-44.
Id. at 340-41.
Id. at 341 (alteration in original).
Id.
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Central Hudson analysis, namely, whether the restrictions on
commercial speech are no more extensive than necessary to
serve the government's interest. The narrowing constructions
of the advertising restrictions announced by the Superior Court
ensure that the restrictions will not affect advertising of casino
gambling aimed at tourists, but will apply only 72to such
advertising when aimed at the residents of Puerto Rico.
Thus, the Court conveniently swept the "least restrictive means" restriction
under the "constitutional carpet" and upheld Puerto Rico's advertising
73
ban.

2. CentralHudson Justifies Government Intrusion
Prior to 44 Liquormart, both the Supreme Court as well as lower
courts used Posadas as sufficient justification for upholding several
advertising restrictions on alcohol, tobacco, and casino gambling. 74 In
United States v. Edge Broadcasting Co., 7 5 the Supreme Court held that a
federal statute prohibiting the broadcast of lottery advertising in states that
prohibit lotteries, while allowing such advertising by broadcasters in states
76
that support lotteries, did not violate the First Amendment.
Defendant Edge, a Virginia broadcaster, was licensed to broadcast in
a North Carolina community that prohibited state lotteries. 77 Edge derived
ninety-five percent of its advertising revenue from Virginia and argued
that the North Carolina advertising restriction deprived the company of
substantial sums of money.
The government, arguing directly from the
Court's opinion in Posadas,contended that the restriction was justified; if
the State could prohibit the vice activity altogether, it certainly could
79
prohibit the advertising of such conduct.
In applying Central Hudson, the Court found that the first three
prongs were easily satisfied.80 First, the advertising of Virginia's lottery
72. Posadasde PuertoRico Assocs., 478 U.S. at 343.
73. Id. at 328.
74. See, e.g., United States v. Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. 418 (1993); Anheuser-Busch, Inc.
v. Mayor of Baltimore, 855 F. Supp. 811 (D. Md. 1994).
75. 509 U.S. 418 (1993).
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 424.
79. Id. at 425; see also Posadasde Puerto Rico Assocs., 478 U.S. at 345-46 ("mhe greater
power to completely ban [an activity] necessarily includes the lesser power to ban advertising of
[that activity].").
80. Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. at 429 (citing Board of Trustees v. Fox, 429 U.S. 469, 480
(1989)).
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was legal and neither misleading nor fraudulent.8 ' Second, the North
Carolina government had a substantial interest in regulating gambling
third, the advertising ban reasonably
among its residents, and
82
accomplished that interest.
The fourth prong again failed to generate much debate among the
Court.8 3 Justice White, writing for the majority, reiterated the Court's
holding in Board of Trustees v. Fox.a4 In Fox, the Court announced a
liberal interpretation of Central Hudson's fourth prong, requiring only8 a5
"reasonable fit" between the government's interest and the restriction.
86
The fit need not be perfect, only reasonable.
In 1995, the Court used the fourth prong to strike down a federal7
statute that prohibited the advertising of alcohol content on beer labels.8
In Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., the Court held that a federal statute
prohibiting the inclusion of alcohol content on beer labels s9 violates the
First Amendment. 90 Coors applied to the U.S. Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco and Firearms for approval of its labels disclosing the alcohol
content of the beer.9 1 The Bureau denied the application due to Coors'
violation of the statute. 92 The government attempted to justify the statute
as a necessary measure to prevent "strength wars" among brewers who
the potency of their beer to effectively compete
might otherwise increase
93
in the marketplace.
The Court found that the government had a "substantial interest" in
protecting the health, safety, and welfare of its citizens and that prohibitinA
alcohol content labeling would prevent strength wars between brewers.
Applying Posadas, the Court reasoned that just as the government had a
"substantial" interest in regulating gambling among its citizens, it also has
81.
82.
83.
84.

Id. at 428.
Id. at 429.
Id. at 429-31.
492 U.S. 469 (1989) (holding that the court need only find a "reasonable fit" between

the government's asserted interest and the means chosen to accomplish those ends where state

regulation sought to prohibit commercial transactions in state-funded dormitories).
85. Id. at 480.
86. Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. at 429.

87. See Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476 (1995).
88. Id.
89. Federal Alcohol Administration Act, Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4517, 4521

(codified as amended at 27 U.S.C. § 201 (1994)).
90. Rubin, 514 U.S. at 490.
91. Id. at 478.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 479.
94. Id. at 485.
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a "substantial" interest in tempering alcoholism and the social costs
accompanying alcohol use. 95 Surprisingly, the statute was ultimately
struck down because it failed to comply with the fourth prong of Central
Hudson. The Court held that while the government may have a sufficient
interest in regulating strength wars, 96the statute failed to advance that
interest in a manner justifying the ban.
3. The End of CentralHudson's Legacy
44 Liquormart marked the end of the "reasonable fit" and
"substantial governmental interests" tests. 97 The Court's recent holding
essentially overruled Posadas, thereby making any state regulation of
commercial speech an extremely difficult task. 44 Liquormart also
expressly rejected the "greater includes lesser power" argument advanced
in Edge, reasoning that banning speech is far more intrusive than banning
conduct.99
Essentially, 44 Liquormart emasculated the fourth prong of Central
Hudson. Justice O'Connor announced a variety of less restrictive
alternatives to a complete ban on alcohol price advertising, ranging from
increases in taxation, to price regulation and educational campaigns
targeting the adverse effects of alcohol. 1' 6 According to the Court, a
complete ban on alcohol would presumably beI0 1a less restrictive alternative
than governing the advertising of the product.
While restrictions on commercial speech may pass strict scrutiny,
they can ultimately fail the narrow interpretation of the fourth prong

95. Id.
96. Rubin, 514 U.S. at 486.
97. See Wilson, supra note 12, at S-14 ("After the pounding that any government

restriction on truthful commercial speech took in 44 Liquormart, and the eagerness of all the
justices to favor non-speech alternatives, at best Central Hudsonjust barely survives.").
98. 44Liquormart, 116 S. Ct. at 1511.
99. Id. at 1512 (Stevens, J., plurality opinion) ("In short, we reject the assumption that

words are necessarily less vital to freedom than actions, or that logic somehow proves that the
power to prohibit an activity is necessarily 'greater' than the power to suppress speech about
it.").

100. Id. at 1510.
101. Justice Stevens, in overruling Posadas,stated:
Contrary to the assumption made in Posadas,we think it quite clear that banning
speech may sometimes prove far more intrusive than banning conduct. As a

venerable proverb teaches, it may prove more injurious to prevent people from

teaching others how to fish than to prevent fish from being sold. Similarly, a local

ordinance banning bicycle lessons may curtail freedom far more than one that
prohibits bicycle riding within city limits.
Id. at 1512.
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This holding essentially grants
announced in 44 Liquormart. ° 2
speech a greater degree of protection than noncommercial
commercial
03
speech.'

IV. 44 LIQUORMART, INC. V. RHODE ISLAND: 104
THE COURT DEALS A BLOW TO CENTRAL HUDSON

A. Background
Liquor retailers in Rhode Island brought suit seeking declaratory
relief from a state statute instituting a blanket advertising ban on liquor
prices.' 0 5 44 Liquormart allegedly violated the statute by printing the
word "WOW" next to pictures of vodka and rum bottles.1 6 Although the
advertisement noted that "State law prohibits advertising liquor prices,"
the State nonetheless found that 44 Liquormart's advertisement made an
implied reference to bargain prices for liquor.'0 7 The State reasoned that
this implication undermined the State's interest in reducing
alcohol
08
consumption by avoiding price wars between alcohol retailers.'
After paying the $400 fine mandated by the statute, 44 Liquormart
filed an action in the federal district court against the Rhode Island Liquor
Control Administrator. The store sought a declaratory judgment that the
two Rhode Island statutes violated its First Amendment right to free
speech. 19 After analyzing expert testimony, which concluded that bans on
liquor advertising did not significantly affect alcohol abuse, the district
court held that the statute was unconstitutional because it failed to directly
advance the State's interest in tempering consumption."
The district

102. See Henry Cohen, Cigarette Ad Bans: What About Strict Scrutiny?, CONN. L. TRIB.,
June 3, 1996, at 26; see also discussion infra Part VI.

103. Id. The term "noncommercial speech" encompasses that speech which does not
propose a commercial transaction, but instead articulates a particular point of view. This
category may include books, articles, oral presentations or other speech that does not induce the
listener to purchase a product or service. See generally Board of Trustees v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469,
473-74 (1989).
104. 116 S. Ct. 1495 (1996).

105. R.I. GEN. LAws §§ 3-8-7, 3-8-8.1 (1987).
106. 44 Liquormart, 116 S. Ct. at 1503.

107. Id.
108. Id.

109. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Racine, 829 F. Supp. 543, 544-45 (D.R.I. 1993).
110. Id. at 545.
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extensive than necessary, and therefore
court found the ban was more
1 11
failed the CentralHudson test.
The court further recognized that Rhode Island bore the burden of
justifying the blanket restriction. The district court held that the Twenty
First Amendment, which allows the states to control the transport or
does not shift or diminish the
import of liquor within their borders, 112 113
Amendment.
First
the
under
burden
states'
The First Circuit reversed the district court's holding. 114 The court of
appeals narrowly construed the fourth prong of CentralHudson. The court
only required that the State employ a reasonable method to accomplish its
other means (i.e.,
interest; there is no additional burden to prove that some
15
taxation or regulation) would have been less effective. 1
Additionally, the First Circuit found "inherent merit" in the State's
asserted claim that a price advertising ban would prohibit liquor retailers
from lowering prices, which in turn would temper consumption.1 6 The
court stated that retailers would not expend vast amounts of money on
advertisements if those advertisements were not effective in inducing
consumers to purchase their products. 117 The First Circuit thus concluded
that Rhode Island's ban on price advertising
survived the CentralHudson
11
analysis and found against 44 Liquormart. 8
B. The Supreme Court's Holding
The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals' decision, holding
that blanket price advertising bans on liquor directly violate the First
Amendment.1 9 Justice Stevens, in Part VII of the opinion, addressed the
111. Id. at 555.
112. "The transportation or importation into any State, Territory, or possession of the
United States for delivery or use therein of intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws thereof,
is hereby prohibited." U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, § 2 (emphasis added).
113. 44 Liquormart, Inc., v. Racine, 829 F. Supp. at 551-54.
114. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 39 F.3d 5 (1st Cir. 1994).
115. Id,
116. Id. at 7.
117. Id. at8.
118. Id.
119. 44 Liquormart, 116 S. Ct. at 1495. Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court
with respect to Parts I, II, VII, and VIII. Justice Stevens was joined by Justices Kennedy,
Souter, and Ginsburg with respect to Parts I and V. Justices Kennedy and Ginsburg joined
Justice Stevens with respect to Part IV. Justices Kennedy, Thomas, and Ginsburg also joined
Justice Stevens' opinion in Part VI. Separate concurring opinions were entered by Justice Scalia
and Justice Thomas. Justice O'Connor, joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Souter and
Breyer, delivered a fourth concurring opinion. In all, four separate opinions were delivered,
none of which commanded a majority of the Court. Id. at 1498-1500.
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State's argument that the Twenty-First Amendment 120 granted the state
legislature the regulatory authority to prohibit commerce in, or the use of,
alcoholic beverages. 2 1 Justice Stevens unequivocally stated that the
Twenty-First Amendment could not rescue Rhode Island's price ban
because that provision does not abridge or override other amendments to
the Constitution, namely the First Amendment. 22 In other words,
although states are given general authority to regulate liquor within their
jurisdiction, they 23
are not exempt from complying with other provisions of
the Constitution.'
In addition, Justice Stevens noted in Part V of the opinion that
"special care" is required when states institute blanket bans on
advertising. 24 Citing Edenfield v. Fane,12 5 the Court stated:
The commercial market-place, like other spheres of our social
and cultural life, provides a forum where ideas and information
flourish. Some of the ideas and information are vital, some of
slight worth. But the general rule is that the speaker and the
audience, not the government, assess the value of the
information presented. Thus, even a communication that does
no more than propose a commercial126transaction is entitled to the
coverage of the First Amendment.
In assessing the proper standard of review Justice Stevens, joined by
Justices Kennedy and Ginsburg, recognized that not all forms of
commercial speech are afforded "standard" First Amendment
protection. 1
State regulations, which seek to protect consumers from
fraudulent, misleading, or deceptive information, are consistent with
28
constitutional protections and are subject to a lesser standard of review.
However, when a state imposes a restriction that entirely prohibits the
dissemination of truthful, legal, and nonmisleading information, there is
little reason for departing from the rigid standards of First Amendment

120. U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, § 2.
121. 44 Liquormart, 116 S. Ct. at 1514 (Stevens, J., plurality opinion).
122. Id. at 1501.
123. Id. at 1514 ("'[T]he Amendment does not license the States to ignore their obligations
under other provisions of the Constitution."') (quoting Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467
U.S. 691, 712 (1984)).
124. Id. at 1508.
125. 507 U.S. 761 (1993).
126. 44 Liquormart, 116 S. Ct. at 1508 (Stevens, J., plurality opinion) (citing Edenfield,
507 U.S. at 767).
127. Id. at 1506.
128. Id. at 1507.
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review. 129 In the instant case, Rhode Island's blanket130ban on the price
scrutiny.
advertising of liquor was subject to heightened
Rhode Island's ban failed for two primary reasons.

First, the

advertising ban did not directly advance the State's interest in promoting
temperance. 13 1 Second, Rhode Island's ban failed the fourth prong of the
Central Hudson test because it was more restrictive than necessary to
accomplish the State's goal of tempering alcohol consumption. 132 Both
Justice O'Connor's and Justice Stevens' plurality suggested a number of
less restrictive alternatives to promoting the State's interest. 133 The
O'Connor plurality argued that the fit between Rhode Island's method of
employing a blanket ban on price advertising and its goal of tempering
alcohol consumption was not reasonable. 134 By employing any one of the
numerous alternatives previously suggested, Justice O'Connor argued the
achieve its goal without compromising First
State could more effectively
35
rights.1
Amendment
C. The CurrentHurdles of ConstitutionalReview
In many respects, 44 Liquormart undermined the Central Hudson
test.
While Central Hudson still exists in theory, the Court's current
interpretation of the test is now very narrowly defined. Before a court can
begin applying the test, it must determine whether the speech is actually
If the court
"commercial" and the appropriate standard of review.
13 6

129. Id.
130. Id. at 1508.
131. Id.at 1509. A commercial speech regulation will not be upheld if it provides only
ineffective or remote support for the government's purpose. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp.
v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 564 (1980). The state bears the burden of showing that
the regulation will advance its interest to a "material degree." Edenfield, 507 U.S. at 770-71.
Rhode Island failed to meet its burden of showing that a blanket price advertising ban on liquor
would "materially" reduce alcohol consumption among its citizens. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v.
Rhode Island, 39 F.3d 5 (1st Cir. 1994). The district court found there was a "pronounced lack
of unanimity among researchers who have studied the impact of advertising on the level of
consumption of alcoholic beverages." 44 Liquormart, 116 S. Ct. at 1503 (Stevens, J., plurality
opinion). The court relied on a 1985 Federal Trade Commission study showing that there was
no evidence of a connection between liquor advertising and alcohol abuse. Id.
132. 44 Liquormart, 116 S.Ct. at 1510 (Stevens, J., plurality opinion).
133. Id.(suggesting that maintenance of higher prices through increased taxation or
government regulation, rationing of per capita purchases, or implementation of educational
campaigns are all aimed at reducing drinking problems); see also id. at 1522 (O'Connor, J.,
plurality opinion) (same).
134. 44 Liquormart, 116 S. Ct. at 1521 (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion).
135. Id. at 1522.
136. See Wilson, supra note 12, at S-14.
137. 44 Liquormart, 116 S.Ct. at 1507 (Stevens, J., plurality opinion); see infra Parts
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categorizes the expression as truthful, nonmisleading commercial speech,
then the government faces a substantial burden in justifying the
regulation.
1. Assessing Whether Speech Is Truly "Commercial"
In determining the proper standard of review, the Court unanimously
agreed that not all commercial speech is subject to the same level of
constitutional review merely because the speech is categorized as
"commercial."' 39 The courts face an arduous task in determining whether
1 40
the speech is commercial in nature.
In Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co.,14 1 although both parties conceded
14 2
that the alcohol content on beer labels constituted commercial speech,
Justice Stevens stated that the "borders of the commercial speech category
are not nearly as clear as the Court has assumed . . . ."
Justice Stevens
further noted:
The case before us aptly demonstrates the artificiality of a rigid
commercial/noncommercial distinction. The speech at issue
here is an unadorned, accurate statement, on the label of a bottle
of beer, of the alcohol content of the beverage contained
therein. This, the majority finds is "commercial speech." The
majority does not explain why the words "4.73% alcohol by
volume" are commercial .... It thus appears, from the facts of
this case, that whether or not speech
is "commercial" has no
44
necessary relationship to its content.'
The Stevens plurality noted that Rhode Island erred in assuming that
if a particular form of speech suggests a commercial transaction, it should
45
be labeled "commercial" and thus subject to a lesser standard of review.
The appropriate distinction is between speech that seeks to disseminate
truthful, nonmisleading information versus those deceptive advertisements

IV.C.1, IV.C.2.
138. 44 Liquormart, 116 S. Ct. at 1507 (Stevens, J., plurality opinion).

139. Id.
140. See Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 491 (1995) (Stevens, J., concurring)
(stating that applying the Central Hudson test is not sufficiently related to the Court's reasons
for heightened regulation of commercial speech).
141. 514 U.S. 476 (1995).
142. Id. at481.

143. Id. at 493.
144. Id. at 494 (citation omitted).
145. 44 Liquormart, 116 S. Ct. at 1507 (Stevens, J., plurality opinion). See generally supra
Part I.A.
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that induce consumer purchases. 146 Courts analyze these two categories of
"commercial speech" under very different levels of constitutional
review. 147
2. Standard of Review
Government regulations that seek to impose blanket bans on speech,
such as Rhode Island's price advertising ban, are subject to the highest
level of judicial scrutiny. 14 8 In these cases, the Court draws a distinction
between three categories of speech: (1) complete bans; (2) "content-neutral
149
restrictions" on the time, place or manner of commercial expression;
and (3) those advertisements that are misleading or deceptive.
The category of commercial speech that is granted the lowest level of
constitutional protection is speech that aggressively targets consumers and
induces them to purchase products through misleading or deceptive
information.' 5 1 According to Justice Stevens, governmental regulation of
this type of speech is generally justified. The intent of the regulation is to
protect consumers from misleading or erroneous information. The purpose
of regulating misinformation is consistent with the goals of the First
Amendment.a1 2 Because commercial speech is15 subject
to a lower standard
3
of review, such restrictions are usually upheld.
Justice Stevens suggested that the second category of advertisements,
54
those that are "content-neutral," is subject to a lesser standard of review.1
Content-neutral restrictions control only the time, place, or manner for
disseminating advertisements, unlike those regulations that govern the
substance of what may be printed or broadcast. 15 Such restrictions do not
146. 44 Liquormart, 116 S. Ct. at 1507 (Stevens, J., plurality opinion).
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. See discussion infra Part V.C.
150. 44 Liquormart, 116 S. Ct. at 1507 (Stevens, J., plurality opinion).
151. Id.
152. Id. ("When a State regulates commercial messages to protect consumers from
misleading, deceptive, or aggressive sales practices, or requires the disclosure of beneficial
consumer information, the purpose of its regulation is consistent with the reasons for according
constitutional protection to commercial speech and therefore justifies less than strict review.").
153. Id.
154. See id. "[C]omplete speech bans, unlike content-neutral restrictions on the time,
place, or manner of expression are particularly dangerous because they all but foreclose
alternative means of disseminating certain information." Id. (citation omitted).
155. For example, a regulation may restrict billboard advertisement of alcoholic products
near schools, parks, or sporting events where children will frequently encounter the
advertisements. Rather than restricting what liquor companies may print, the government
restricts where such printing appears. Likewise, content-neutral restrictions may not completely
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they allow alternative
pose the same First Amendment concerns because
56
methods for disseminating the information.1
Assessing whether an advertising restriction is "content-based" or
"content-neutral" is not a particularly clear-cut distinction.' 57 However,
this distinction is necessary to assess the level of review applicable to
restrictions on billboard advertising 158 or prohibitions on vice product
advertising near school zones.1 59 In other words, companies wishing to
advertise "vice products" in selected areas of a city will likely fail
constitutional challenges to state prohibitions on billboard advertising of
their products. The Court suggests that these restrictions will not be
subject to the same level of heightened scrutiny as blanket bans on
advertising
of "vice products," and may likely pass constitutional
60
muster. 1
The third category deals with truthful and nonmisleading commercial
speech, which receives the greatest level of protection. 6 1 Justice Stevens
explicitly stated that where the government seeks to keep the public
uninformed for what it perceives
as being for the public good, the courts
1 62
must be extremely skeptical.
The price advertising ban in 44 Liquormart was unquestionably a
blanket restriction on the advertising of truthful, nonmisleading speech
about a legal product.! 63 Further, the end sought by the regulation,
164
specifically consumer protection, does not sufficiently relate to the ban.
Therefore, 44 Liquormart's advertisements fall into
the third category and
165
must be reviewed under a "special care" analysis.

ban the advertising of other "vice products," but may limit the time of day such advertisements
appear on television.

156. 44 Liquormart,116 S. Ct. at 1507 (Stevens, J., plurality opinion).
157. See Linmark Assocs. v. Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977) (holding that state action
restricting "For Sale" signs constituted a content-based ban and therefore failed to provide a
satisfactory alternative form of communication).
158. See Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Mayor of Baltimore, 855 F. Supp. 811 (D. Md. 1994).
159. See Penn Adver. v. Mayor of Baltimore, 862 F. Supp. 1402 (D. Md. 1994).
160. 44 Liquormart, 116 S. Ct. at 1507 (Stevens, J., plurality opinion).
161. Id. at 1507-08.
162. Id. at 1508. "[Wjhen a State entirely prohibits the dissemination of truthful,
nonmisleading commercial messages for reasons unrelated *to the preservation of a fair
bargaining process, there is far less reason to depart from the rigorous review that the First
Amendment generally demands." Id. at 1507.
163. Id. at 1508.
164. Id.
165. Id.
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3. CentralHudson: A Test Redefined
Although the Court unanimously agreed that Rhode Island's price
advertising ban was unconstitutional, the Court split in applying the
Central Hudson test. While the Court remains divided over the level of

protection for commercial speech, the differences are less pronounced than
in the past.166

a. The Stevens Plurality
Justice Stevens remained consistent with his prior opinions in
holdng
ruthul,
tat nonmisleading
onmsleaing commercial
167
holding that
truthful,
speech should receive full
protection under the First Amendment.
Joined by Justices Kennedy,
Souter, and Ginsburg, Justice 16
Stevens
advocated
a heightened standard of
8
review under CentralHudson.
The opinion described three categories of commercial speech, 169
as
scrutiny.
judicial
of
levels
respective
their
and
discussed,
previously
Justice Stevens concluded that bans on truthful or nonmisleading speech
rarely protect the public. Rather, such restrictions impermissibly deny
consumers access to truthful information when the government perceives it
is for the public good. 170 The Stevens plurality believed that the Rhode
Island price advertising ban was an example of offensive paternalism and
thus subject to "special care" or strict scrutiny. 17 1 However, the level of
judicial scrutiny Stevens proposed may, in fact, have been even greater
than strict scrutiny. 172 The Court noted
that such blanket bans on speech
173
muster.
constitutional
passed
rarely
166. Kent, supra note 5, at 3.
167. See, e.g., Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410 (1993) (holding that
city's categorical ban on the distribution of handbills via news racks was inconsistent with First
Amendment principles, Justice Stevens warned against devaluing commercial speech and thus
cabining advertising into a separate and distinct category of speech); Rubin v. Coors Brewing
Co., 514 U.S. 476, 491 (1995) (Stevens, J., concurring) (concurring in the Court's holding that
the labeling ban violated the First Amendment but urging a lower standard of First Amendment
protection only for "transaction-driven speech" which generally does not incite public debate).
168. 44 Liquormart, 116 S. Ct. at 1508-09 (Stevens, J., plurality opinion).
169. See discussion supra Part IV.C.2. The three categories include deceptive or
fraudulent speech, "content-neutral" restrictions, and truthful or nonmisleading speech. 44
Liquormart, 116 S. Ct. at 1507-08 (Stevens, J., plurality opinion).
170. 44 Liquormart, 116 S. Ct. at 1508 (Stevens, J.,
plurality opinion).
171. Id.
172. See discussion infra Part IV.C.3.e.
173. 44 Liquormart, 116 S.Ct. at 1508 (Stevens, J., plurality opinion); see id.at 1522
(O'Connor, J., plurality opinion) ("[W]e must review the price advertising ban with 'special
care,' mindful that speech prohibitions of this type rarely survive constitutional review.")
(citations omitted).
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The Stevens plurality also concluded that Rhode Island's price
advertising ban failed the third and fourth prong of the Central Hudson
test 174 Under the third prong, the State bears the burden of demonstrating
1

that the proposed regulation advances its interest to a "material degree."
Based on the absence of any evidentiary support or factual
176 findings, the
burden.
its
satisfy
to
failed
State
the
that
concluded
Court
The statute also failed Central Hudson's fourth prong. The Stevens
and O'Connor pluralities both acknowledged numerous alternatives
proposed by 44 Liquormart to a complete ban on truthful, nonmisleading
information including: (1) the maintenance of higher prices through direct
regulation or increased taxation; (2) limitations on per capita purchases; 1or
77
(3) educational campaigns focused on the dangers of excessive drinking.
Each of these alternatives provided a less restrictive means than a blanket
ban on price advertising. Even under a less stringent standard78 of review,
Rhode Island's statute could not meet constitutional standards.1
By applying the Central Hudson test under heightened judicial
review, the fourth prong essentially swallows the test. Virtually every
proposed alternative is available to state legislatures and is less restrictive
than banning the product's advertisement. 179 The consequence of Central
Hudson's fourth prong, if narrowly construed, is that there are no
circumstances under which the price advertising ban could be upheld. As
noted in Justice Thomas' concurrence, no speech regulation could possibly
survive Stevens' application of the fourth prong.
Because direct
regulation of the activity itself will always prove to be a less restrictive
means, regulation of speech regarding the activity will always be more
extensive than necessary.181
174. Id. at 1508-10.
175. Id. at 1508.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 1510 (Stevens, J., plurality opinion); see also id. at 1522 (O'Connor, J., plurality
opinion).
178. Id.
179. See 44 Liquormart, 116 S. Ct. at 1519 (Thomas, J., concurring). State legislatures
have various options available, including the ability to heavily tax or regulate alcohol, or the
ability to prohibit it altogether. Each of these alternatives are preferable to the regulation of
speech surrounding the product. Therefore, any attempts to directly regulate or prohibit
distribution of alcohol will always be viewed as "less restrictive" alternatives to a price
advertising ban. There are no circumstances in which such a ban could survive Central
Hudson's fourth prong. Id.
180. Id.; see discussion infra Part IV.C.3.c and accompanying notes.
181. 44 Liquormart, 116 S. Ct. at 1519 (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Thomas stated, in
pertinent part:

The opinions would appear to commit the courts to striking down restrictions on
speech whenever a direct regulation (i.e., a regulation involving no restriction on
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The Stevens plurality therefore suggests that, although Central
Hudson survives in theory, any state regulation of truthful or nondeceptive
information will undoubtedly fail the fourth prong.1 2 The opinion reflects
Justice Stevens' dissatisfaction with the historic treatment of commercial
speech under the First Amendment.1 3 44 Liquormartmarks the end of the
Court's treatment of commercial speech as a category less worthy of
constitutional protection than noncommercial speech.
The Stevens plurality essentially obliterates the distinction between
commercial speech (where that speech is truthful and not misleading) and
noncommercial speech, applying strict scrutiny to both categories. A
significant query, therefore, is whether any restriction can survive the
fourth prong. Presumably, under the Stevens' approach, there will always
be a less restrictive alternative, even if it requires banning the product or
activity altogether. As Part VI will address, Justice Stevens may actually
be affording greater protection to commercial speech than noncommercial
speech.
b. The O'Connor Plurality
Chief Justice Rehnquist
~185 and Justices Souter and Breyer have joined
Justice O'Connor in routinely applying the Central Hudson test.
The
plurality, adopting Justice Stevens' reasoning, concluded that Rhode
Island's statute failed CentralHudson's fourth prong:
The fit between Rhode Island's method and this particular goal
is not reasonable. If the target is simply higher prices generally
speech regarding lawful activity at all) would be an equally effective method of
dampening demand by legal users. But it would seem that directly banning a
product (or rationing it, taxing it, controlling its price, or otherwise restricting its
sale in specific ways) would virtually always be at least as effective in
discouraging consumption as merely restricting advertising regarding the product
would be, and thus virtually all restrictions with such a purpose would fail the
fourth prong of the Central Hudson test.
Id.
182. Id. at 1508 (Stevens, J., plurality opinion).
183. Compare 44 Liquormart v. Rhode Island, 116 S. Ct. 1495 (1996), with Valentine v.
Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942), and Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976), and Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public
Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
184. See David 0. Stewart, Change Brewing in Commercial Speech: Decision Signals
Shift Toward GreaterFirstAmendment Protection, 82 A.B.A. J. 44 (1996).
185. 44 Liquormart, 116 S.Ct. at 1520-21 (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion). It is
noteworthy that, historically, Chief Justice Rehnquist has been the principal supporter of
governmental restrictions on commercial speech. Many commentators have said that "Justice
Rehnquist had never yet seen a restriction on commercial speech that he did not like." Kent,
supra note 5, at 3. The Chief Justice wrote the opinion of the Court in Posadas,an opinion he
now denounces. Id.
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to discourage consumption, the regulation imposes too great,
and unnecessary, a prohibition on speech in order to achieve it.
The State has other methods at its disposal---methods that
would more directly accomplish this stated goal without
intruding on sellers' ability to provide truthful, nonmisleading
information to customers . . . . A tax, for example, is not
normally very difficult to administer and would have a far more
certain and
direct effect on prices, without any restriction on
86
speech.1
The principal difference between the O'Connor and the Stevens
approach is the standard of review they choose to aply. Justice O'Connor
rejects Stevens' "special care" standard of scrutiny.
Because the Rhode
Island statute could not withstand the less stringent level of review under a
normal CentralHudson analysis,
Justice O'Connor saw no need to adopt a
188
higher standard of review.
While the Court unanimously arrives at the same conclusion, the
O'Connor plurality does so on much narrower grounds. 1 9 Because the
State failed to establish a reasonable fit between the price advertising ban
and its asserted interest in temperance, Justice O'Connor
did not find it
190
Hudson.
Central
overruling
consider
to
necessary
c. Justice Thomas Rejects CentralHudson
Justice Thomas emerges as the champion supporter of affording full
First Amendment protection to commercial speech. 19 1 He denounces the
Stevens approach of categorizing speech in order to determine the proper
level of review. 192 Thomas stated, "I do not see a philosophical or
historical basis for asserting that 'commercial' speech is of 'lower value'
than 'noncommercial' speech. Indeed, some historical materials suggest to
186. 44 Liquormart, 116 S. Ct. at 1521-22 (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion).
187. Id. at 1522.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 1523. Chief Justice Rehnquist, as well as Justices Souter and Breyer, joined
Justice O'Connor in this opinion. Id.at 1520.
190. Id. at 1522.
191. 44 Liquormart, 116 S. Ct. at 1517-18 (Thomas, J., concurring).
192. Id.at 1515-16. Justice Thomas stated:
In cases such as this, in which the government's asserted interest is to keep legal
users of a product or service ignorant in order to manipulate their choices in the
marketplace, the balancing test adopted in Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v.
Public Serv. Comm 'n ofNY., should not be applied, in my view. Rather, such an
"interest" is per se illegitimate and can no more justify regulation of
"commercial" speech than it can justify regulation of "noncommercial" speech.
Id. (citation omitted).
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the contrary."' 193 Justice Thomas concludes it was an error to apply any
form of the Central Hudson test.194 Where the state imposes blanket bans
on truthful and nonmisleading advertising, the restriction must be
immediately denounced as per se unconstitutional. 195 He illustrated the
flaw in Stevens' reasoning by stating the following:
Application of the advancement-of-state-interest prong of
Central Hudson makes little sense to me in such circumstances.
Faulting the State for failing to show that its price advertising
ban decreases alcohol consumption "significantly," as Justice
Stevens does, seems to imply that if the State had been more
successful at keeping consumers ignorant and thereby
decreasing their
consumption, then the restriction might have
196
been upheld.
Justice Thomas further criticizes Stevens' approach by noting that in
every instance where the state seeks to temper undesirable behavior, there
is always a "least restrictive means." 197 The state may opt to heavily tax,
ration the distribution, or otherwise restrict access to vice products. 198 The
Stevens opinion held that such methods provide a less restrictive
alternative to banning commercial advertisements. The result is that
"virtually all restrictions with such a purpose would fail the fourth prong
of the Central Hudson test."' 199 Although Justice Thomas agreed with
Justice Stevens' conclusion, he argued that they employed flawed
reasoning in invalidating the statute. Rather than applying Central
Hudson's fourth prong, the Court should merely invalidate "all attempts to
dissuade legal choices by citizens by keeping them ignorant .... ,,200
d. Justice Scalia Stands Alone
Justice Scalia concurs only in the judgment, denying a majority to
either the Stevens or O'Connor pluralities.20 1 Justice Scalia shares Justice
Thomas'
discomfort
with the
application
of Central
Hudson.20governmental
He further
shares Justice
Stevens
"aversion
towards
paternalistic

193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.

Id. at 1518.
Id. at 1520.
Id.
Id. at 1518 (citations omitted).
44Liquormart,116 S. Ct. at 1519.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1520.
44 Liquormart, 116 S. Ct. at 1515 (Scalia, J., concurring).
Id.
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policies that prevent men and women from hearing facts that might not be
good for them." 20 3 Justice Scalia asserts, however, that the Court took an
equally paternalistic position in preventing a democratic society from
enacting laws that the Court itself deems paternalistic. 204 He argues that
the Court should be guided by the practices of the American people and
focus on state legislative policies toward commercial speech at the time
the First Amendment was adopted. 20 5 Because such determinations could
not be made based on the facts before the Court, Justice Scalia was
compelled to2 follow
existing jurisprudence, and thus applied the Central
6
Hudson test.
e. Analysis
The spectrum of opinions announced in 44 Liquormart ranges from
Justice O'Connor's reaffirmation of Central Hudson to Justice Thomas'
unequivocal rejection of the test. While all the justices
arrive at the same
20 7
conclusion, they do so under four separate approaches.
Justice Thomas, while arguably the most extreme, sets the best
precedent for future commercial speech cases. By expressly rejecting
CentralHudson and eliminating the arbitrary line between commercial and
noncommercial speech, Justice Thomas attempts to broaden First
Amendment protection of commercial speech.
The First Amendment, on its face, does not delineate between types
of speech, nor does it consider whether one category deserves higher
protection than another. 2 08 Indeed, all speech is equally worthy of
constitutional protection. The answer must be in advocating more speech,
not in enforcing silence. 209 By analyzing commercial speech under strict
scrutiny, the doctrine applicable to noncommercial speech, consumers will
still be amply protected. Strict scrutiny analysis does not per se invalidate
every restriction on speech; rather, it merely applies a heightened level of
review.

203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id.

206. Id.
207. See supra note 119 for a listing of the various opinions.
208. "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press...
U.S. CONST. amend. I; see also Michael W. Field, Note, On Tap, 44 Liquormart, Inc. v.
Rhode Island: Last Callfor the Commercial Speech Doctrine, 2 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV.
57, 62 (1996).
209. 44 Liquormart,116 S. Ct. at 1505 (Stevens, J., plurality opinion).
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Central Hudson is essentially nothing more than a case-by-case
As a threshold matter, this approach mandates a
balancing test.
delineation between categories of speech. Under the commercial speech
doctrine, whether or not speech is worthy of protection depends upon what
the speech advocates or proposes. Justice Thomas stated, as this author
agrees, that such a delineation between categories of speech is
unwarranted. The principles underlying speech should not determine
whether or not that speech merits greater constitutional protections.
As this Note concludes in Part VI, all speech is in some sense
commercial. 210 The speaker, in most situations, expects or encourages the
audience to "buy" a particular viewpoint. The existence of a commercial
context should not change the standard of review. All speech is equally
worthy of protection under the First Amendment regardless of what it may
be promoting, whether a controversial political viewpoint, an unpopular set
of beliefs, or a commercial transaction.

V. THE IMPACT OF 44 LIQUORMART
44 Liquormart has received a mixed reception in the legal
community. As some scholars predicted, the Supreme Court's ruling has
thus far had little impact on subsequent cases restricting the time, place, or
manner in which vice products, such as alcohol or tobacco, can be
advertised.
Those cases have limited the Court's holding to blanket
bans and complete prohibitions against advertising. 2 12 Therefore, 44
Liquormart has not impacted state statutes that narrowly
tailor their
2 13
restrictions to the time, place, or manner of advertising.

210. See infra Part VI.
211. See discussion infra Part V.C; see also Stewart, supranote 184, at 44.
212. For example, on two occasions, the Baltimore City Council successfully argued that a
distinction should be made between blanket bans on advertising and "content-neutral bans" on
the time, place, and manner of such restrictions. See Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Schmoke, 101
F.3d 325 (4th Cit. 1996) (holding that city ordinance prohibiting placement of stationary
outdoor advertising that advertised alcoholic beverages in areas where it was likely to be
encountered by minors merely restricted time, place and manner of such advertisements and did
not violate First Amendment's commercial speech guarantees), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1569
(1997); Penn Adver., Inc. v. Mayor of Baltimore, 63 F.3d 1318 (4th Cir. 1995) (holding that city
statute banning tobacco advertising on billboards did not violate the First Amendment), vacated
sub nom. Penn Adver., Inc. v. Schmoke, 116 S. Ct. 2575 (1996), on remand sub nom. Penn
Adver., Inc. v. Mayor of Baltimore, 101 F.3d 332, 333 (4th Cir. 1996) ("We have read the
opinion in 44 Liquormart and have considered its impact on the judgment in this case [63 F.3d
1318].... [W]e conclude that 44 Liquormartdoes not require us to change our decision ..
cert. denied sub nom. Penn Adver., Inc. v. Schmoke, 117 S. Ct. 1569 (1997).
213. See cases cited supranote 212.
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In contrast, other scholars argue that 44 Liquormart effectively
affords a greater degree of protection to commercial advertising than to
noncommercial speech.2 14 This section analyzes the specific impact of the
case by addressing: (1) the overruling of Posadas; (2) the impact of the
Supreme Court's holding on the CentralHudson test; and (3) the results of
those cases that were remanded in light of 44 Liquormart.
A. Posadas Overruled
44 Liquormartessentially overruled Posadas.2 15 Posadas was widely
criticized from the beginning. As one scholar noted, "Posadas . . . 'Twas
Strange, 'Twas Passing Strange, 'Twas Pitiful, 'Twas Wondrous
Pitiful." 216 Posadas held that, under Central Hudson, it was within the
legislature's power to determine the best manner to support the State's
interest; Rhode 2 17
Island utilizes this reasoning to uphold its own price
advertising ban.
Justice Stevens concluded that Posadas "erroneously performed the
First Amendment analysis. ' 218 The effect of Posadaswas to keep truthful,
nonmisleading information from the public for the purpose of controlling
behavior. Puerto Rico's anti-gambling policy was therefore immune
"from the public scrutiny that more direct, nonspeech regulation would
draw., 219 Justice Stevens then concluded:
Given our longstanding hostility to commercial speech
regulation of this type, Posadasclearly erred in concluding that
it was "up to the legislature" to choose suppression over a less
speech-restrictive policy. The Posadas majority's conclusion
on that point cannot be reconciled with the unbroken line of
prior cases striking down similarly broad regulations on
truthful, nonmisleading advertising
when non-speech-related
220
available.
were
alternatives

214. Cohen, supra note 102, at 26; see also Jerome L. Wilson, Rulings Cast Doubt on SLA
Advertising Restrictions, N.Y.L.J., July 24, 1996, at 1.
215. 44 Liquormart, 116 S. Ct. at 1511 (Stevens, J., plurality opinion).
216. Philip B. Kurland, Posadas de Puerto Rico v. Tourism Company: "'Twas Strange,
'Twas PassingStrange; 'Twas Pitiful, 'Twas Wondrous Pitiful," 1986 SUP. CT.REV. 1, 12-15.
217. 44 Liquormart, 116 S. Ct. at 1511 (Stevens, J., plurality opinion).
218. Id.

219. Id. (citing Posadas de Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 478 U.S.
328, 351 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting)).
220. Id.
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The Court thus rejected the majority's conclusion in Posadas. A state
legislature no longer has broad power to suppress truthful, nonmisleading
information that it perceives as being against the public good.2 2'
Posadas has since been denounced as a "gross perversion[] ... of
First Amendment law." 222 In its ten-year legacy, however, Posadas
successfully justified numerous government regulations on commercial
223
speech .u The opinion granted enormous deference to state legislatures,
permitting them to employ any "reasonable" means to achieve their
asserted end.224 Unfortunately, such deference infringed upon the First
Amendment. The Court ultimately concludes that the Posadas legacy has
ended.22 As Justice Thomas noted in his concurrence, commercial speech
should 226
not be "less of a constitutional moment" than noncommercial
speech.

B. The CurrentStatus of Central Hudson
As discussed in Part IV, while the Court does not uniformly apply the
Central Hudson test, all justices agree that commercial speech must be
afforded greater protection. 227 Although the CentralHudson test survives
in theory, it allows very few restrictions to survive, particularly those
pertaining to wide bans on speech.228
Justice Thomas emerged as the primary supporter of abandoning the
test.229 Given an appropriate case, Justice Scalia indicated he is likely to
follow Justice Thomas' lead in the future. 23 The O'Connor plurality did
not reach the issue of whether the test should be abandoned only because
the Rhode Island statute was blatantly unconstitutional. 23 1 Finally, as
previously discussed, Justice Stevens' strict application of the fourth prong
essentially subsumed the CentralHudson test.

221. Id.
222. Kurland, supranote 216, at 13.
223. See, e.g., United States v. Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. 418 (1993); Board of Trustees v.
Fox, 492 U.S. 469 (1989).
224. See Posadasde Puerto Rico Assocs., 478 U.S. at 328.
225. See generally 44 Liquormart, 116 S.Ct. at 1510-14 (Stevens, J., plurality opinion).
226. 44 Liquormart, 116 S. Ct. at 1517-18 (Thomas, J., concurring).
227. See generally id. at 1498-1500 (Stevens, J., plurality opinion).
228. See discussion supra Part IV.C.3.a-d.
229. 44 Liquormart, 116 S. Ct. at 1515-16 (Thomas, J., concurring).
230. Id.at 1515 (Scalia, J., concurring).
231. Id.at 1522 (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion).
232. See discussion supra Part IV.C.3.a.
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C. The Lasting Effects of 44 Liquormart
The effects of 44 Liquormart are reverberating throughout the nation.
Although protection of commercial speech has been strengthened, the
implications are unknown. In fact, those cases remanded in light of 44
Liquormarthave not been forced to address the constitutional validity of
commercial speech. 233 In particular, Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Mayor of
Baltimore234 was remanded within days of the Supreme Court's decision in
44 Liquormart. This section analyzes Anheuser-Busch and assesses the
impact 44 Liquormartis likely to have on future commercial speech cases.
23

1. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Mayor of Baltimore

5

In 1994, Anheuser-Busch challenged the validity of a Maryland
statute authorizing the Mayor of Baltimore to implement an ordinance
banning billboard advertising of alcoholic beverages. 236 The district court
applied the Central Hudson test and found that the City was justified in
restricting the advertising. 237 The decision was affirmed by the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals.
The Fourth Circuit's decision, however, was
vacated and remanded for further review in light of the Supreme Court's
holding in 44 Liquormart.239 The Fourth Circuit ultimately held that,
consistent with 44 Liquormart,
the City's ban on advertising did not
240
Amendment.
First
the
violate

233. See, e.g., Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass'n, Inc. v. United States, 78 F.3d 583 (5th
Cir.), vacated, 117 S. Ct. 39 (1996); Pennsylvania State Police v. Hospitality Inv., Inc., 650
A.2d 854 (Pa. 1994), vacated, 116 S. Ct. 1821 (1996); see also cases cited supra note 212.
234. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Mayor of Baltimore, 855 F. Supp. 811 (D. Md. 1994).
235. Id.

236. MD. ANN. CODE art. 2B, § 21-105(c)(1) (1996):
The Mayor and City Council of Baltimore may adopt an ordinance restricting the
placement of signs, posters, placards, devices, graphic displays, or any other forms
of advertising or on the sides of the building of the licensed premises that

advertise alcoholic beverages in publicly visible locations if:
(i)The ordinance is necessary for the promotion of the welfare and
temperance of minors exposed to advertisements for alcoholic beverages
placed in publicly visible locations; and
(ii)The restrictions do not unduly burden legitimate business activities of
persons licensed under this article to sell alcoholic beverages on a retail

237.
238.
239.
240.

basis.
Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 855 F. Supp. at 811.
Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Schmoke, 63 F.3d 1305 (4th Cir. 1995).
Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Schmoke, 116 S. Ct. 1821 (1996).
Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Schmoke, 101 F.3d 325 (4th Cir. 1996).
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The district court in Anheuser-Busch distinguished the case from 241
44
Liquormart, and a similar holding in Adolph Coors Co. v. Bentsen,
explaining that the link between alcohol consumption and price advertising
bans or content labeling is far more tenuous than the link between
consumption and consumer advertising. 242 The court stated that while
commercial advertising may induce some consumers to drink who
otherwise would not, it is doubtful
that blanket bans on price advertising
24 3
would serve the same function.
Neither the ordinance challenged in Anheuser-Busch nor the
ordinance challenged in Adolph Coors Co. involved a blanket restriction
on advertising. Therefore, 44 Liquormart does not explicitly extend far
enough to save either challenge. While both would likely survive the first
three prongs of Central Hudson, presumably each ordinance would not
survive the fourth prong. Applying the reasoning in 44 Liquormart,a state
could be equally effective in reducing alcohol consumption through
increased taxation, per capita limitations on distribution, or educational
campaigns addressing the dangers of using alcohol. 244 Applying the
reasoning of the Stevens plurality, the bans on billboard advertising in
Anheuser-Busch involve "content-neutral" restrictions and are subject to a
lesser standard of review. However, given the Court's current application
of Central Hudson's fourth prong, it is unlikely that a content-based
ordinance would survive any level of judicial scrutiny.
2. The Next Step
The status of commercial speech is far from resolved in the wake of
44 Liquormart. Although all the Justices agree that price advertising bans
are unconstitutional, the level of judicial scrutiny afforded to commercial
advertising remains unclear. Given the Court's current construction, the
CentralHudson test is ripe for rejection.
Justice Thomas is likely the principal supporter of an outright
rejection of the test.245 He unequivocally indicated his distrust of
legislative attempts to suppress truthful information from consumers under
the guise of acting in the public's "interest." 246
Given this

241. 2 F.3d 355 (10th Cir. 1993) (holding that a regulation prohibiting the alcohol content
on malt beverages violated First Amendment protections).
242. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 855 F. Supp. at 817.
243. Id.

244. 44 Liquormart, 116 S. Ct. at 1510 (Stevens, J., plurality opinion).
245. Id. at 1515-16 (Thomas, J., concurring).
246. Id.

19971
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uncompromising position, there is little doubt how Justice Thomas will
hold in future commercial speech cases.
Similarly. Justice Scalia expressed discomfort with the Central
Hudson test. 24 Ultimately, Scalia was guided by precedent, stating that
the Court did not currently have the "wherewithal to declare Central
Hudson wrong--or at least the wherewithal to say what ought to replace it
,248 Absent an ideological belief that Central Hudson should survive
....
as the principal test for commercial speech, Justice Scalia will likely reject
the test in the future.
Additionally, it is likely that Justice Stevens, supported by Justices
Kennedy and Ginsburg, will follow Justice Thomas' lead. The Stevens'
plurality rejected the methodical application of Central Hudson, opting
instead to apply the standards of strict scrutiny. 249 Because the plurality
expressed their discomfort with the test, they restructured the fourth prong
so that it would essentially strike down25 any commercial advertising
restriction, should CentralHudson survive. 0
Those most likely to entrench the existing test are Justices O'Connor,
Souter, and Breyer and Chief Justice Rehnquist. Following the established
precedent, the O'Connor plurality methodically applied Central
Hudson.25 1 Although this plurality proposed a number of less restrictive
alternatives likely to invalidate any blanket ban on
advertising, they
2 52
nonetheless followed the existing structure of the test.
VI. CONCLUSION

Henry Cohen wrote a persuasive editorial in response to 44
Liquormart addressing the issue of whether truthful tobacco advertising,
which passes strict scrutiny, could survive CentralHudson.253 In light of a
recent United States Court of Appeals decision that held protecting
teenagers from indecency (including "four-letter words") was a
"compelling interest, ' 254 Mr. Cohen argued that protecting them from
cancer was certainly equally compelling, if not more so. 255 The editorial
247. 44 Liquormart, 116 S. Ct. at 1515 (Scalia, J., concurring); see discussion supra Part
IV.C.3.d and accompanying notes.
248. 44 Liquormart, 116 S. Ct. at 1515 (Scalia, J., concurring).

249. Id. at 1508-09 (Stevens, J., plurality opinion).
250. See discussion supra Part IV.C.3.a.
251. 44 Liquormart, 116 S. Ct. at 1521 (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion).

252.
253.
254.
255.

Id. at 1521-22.
Cohen, supra note 102, at 26.
Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 58 F.3d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
Cohen, supra note 102, at 26.
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ultimately concluded that it is now possible "that a ban on tobacco
advertising would be struck down under Central Hudson, but would
survive strict scrutiny. In other words, commercial speech may now have
more protection than noncommercial speech." 256 As Justice Thomas held,
and as the Cohen editorial implies, Central Hudson's
fourth prong per se
257
invalidates any restriction on commercial speech.
Clearly, this strict application of Central Hudson's fourth prong
commanded a majority of the Court (with all except Justice Thomas
concurring). We may therefore assume that in any instance where conduct
may be controlled through other means, such as taxation, regulation, or
counter-speech, restrictions on advertising will fail. The editorial seems to
suggest that such a result is counter-intuitive. Such a result, however, is
not necessarily a negative one.
Although the State has a compelling interest in protecting teenagers
from cancer, there are more effective means of achieving that interest other
than controlling speech.
As 44 Liquormart suggests, educational
campaigns, counter-advertising, "content-neutral" restrictions, taxation and
per capita regulation all provide viable alternatives to advertising bans.
All speech is in some sense commercial. Every dialogue advertises
ideas; the speaker is encouraging the listener to adopt (or "buy") a
particular point of view. Simply because the object of the speech is to
exchange a product for financial profit, the category is no less worthy of
First Amendment protection.
While consumers may be induced to purchase alcohol after learning
that the "price is right," they may be equally discouraged from consuming
it upon learning of the dangers inherent in alcohol consumption. The
point, however, is that the choice must ultimately be left with the
consumer, not the government. Wherever the State can achieve its goal
through alternate means, suppressing speech comes at too high a
constitutional price.
MarrieK Stone*

256. Id.
257. 44 Liquormart, 116 S. Ct. at 1519 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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